We analyze firms' investment behavior, differentiating firms according to the cash flow levels they experience during their lifecycles. We consequently consider the firm as the basic unit and not firm-year observations. Firms with persistent positive cash flow show higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than firms with persistent negative cash flow. Independent of the industry they belong to, older firms with positive cash flow show a weaker sensitivity than younger firms with positive cash flow. Firms with persistent negative cash flow are neither younger nor smaller than their counterparts, and their cash flow coefficient can be positive, negative or statistically insignificant. Thus, classifying firms by age or size may not yield a group of firms with similar financial structures.
Introduction
By considering firms rather than firm-year observations, this paper introduces a new approach to confront the well-known challenges of analyzing empirically the interaction between investment and liquidity conditions. Our methodology consists of classifying the firms, and not firm-year observations, according to their level of cash flow. One of the motives to do so is that most theoretical predictions drawn from the corporate finance literature are based on treating the firm as a unit rather than on firm-year observations. This study helps bridge this gap between theory and empirical analysis by investigating the investment behavior of firms that have negative cash flow for consecutive years, versus firms that have positive cash flow for consecutive years, treating the firm as the basic unit. We also recognize that the optimal implementation of an economic policy requires that one is able to identify the firm as the basic unit when it is intended, for example, to alleviate liquidity problems of specific firms with certain characteristics and structure. It should here be unnecessary to emphasize the importance that cash flow conditions have on firms' performance and their access to capital markets in general, especially during a financial crisis like the one we are still experiencing (August 2009).
Let us to remark at the outset, and as documented below, that we find significant differences in the estimated investment behavior of firms, when the firm treated as a unit, versus when firm-year observations are the basic unit.
The main objectives of this paper are the following: i) to analyze the investment behavior of firms that in their lifecycle have rarely or never experienced negative cash flow, and compare it with that of firms that have persistently experienced periods of negative cash flow;
1 ii) to study firms' investment behavior sorting out the effects of financial conditions (i.e. cash flow status) from those of financial frictions (i.e. firm age is used as predictor of financial constrains or information problems) 2 , and iii) to determine what proportion of additional long-run and short-run debt is allocated to new investment for firms of different age experiencing different levels of cash flow.
Few empirical studies in the related literature have treated the firm as the basic unit.
Brown, Fazzari and Peterson (2008) study the effect of financial variables on R&D after excluding firms whose sum of cash flow-to-assets ratio over the sample period is negative.
They argue that these firms are very small startup companies and that their number is trivial in relation to their whole sample of firms. 3 4 In our sample, firms that experience negative cash flow in their life cycle are typically neither young nor small. We here emphasize the investment decisions of firms that face liquidity problems for at least a certain consecutive number of years during their life cycles, and compare these with investments of firms with ample liquidity during their life cycles. In the approach of Brown et al. (2008) , we cannot 1 We have not opted for analyzing the basic regression specification for investment augmented by dummies representing size, industry, and sign (or size) of cash flow because that implies analyzing investment behavior by firm-year observations, as is usually done in the literature. 2 We look into the age of the firm after taking into account its cash flow position over their life cycle in order to sort out financial factors from investment opportunities. Hadlock and Pierce (2008) have shown that age is a particularly useful predictor of constraints.
know whether firms have been exposed to sporadic or continuous periods of distress with scarce liquidity. In our view, it is important for the conduct of economic policy to take into account the liquidity shortage pattern that firms face. If authorities find the need to intervene, they should be more concerned about firms that have persistent liquidity problems than about firms that only occasionally experience negative cash flow. There are the former firms that are likely more prompt to be affected during recessions.
Other empirical work on corporate finance eliminates the observations of firm-years (see Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) ), or observations are classified into firm-years with negative cash flow and firm-years with positive cash flow (see Cleary et al., 2007) when analyzing investment-cash flow sensitivity. In our view, this is an important weakness of the literature. One of the problems is that a firm may end up belonging to both groups over time, and the capital structure of each firm is not preserved across samples. Moreover, if within a specific industry one constructs a sample that either excludes all negative cash flow firm-year observations, and another that contains only such firm-year observations, one may respectively upward-or downward-bias respectively the internal financial strength of the average firm in the corresponding sample. These procedures materially influence the estimation results and consequently the conclusions drawn. The relevant literature nevertheless argues that within any industry, a sample of firm-year observations with solely negative (positive) cash flow must represent firms that experience liquidity shortage (slackness) early (late) in their lifecycle, and therefore have similar financial structures.
The empirical work in this paper uses comprehensive firm-level panel data from
Norway. This data set contains the annual financial statements 5 of limited liability enterprises registered with the Norwegian register for business enterprises over the years 1988 -2003 consists of more than 1.7 million observations for around 117,000 enterprises in different industries. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel data set. We study firms in each of the following industries: Manufacturing, Construction, Transportation, Computer and Data Technology, and Hotels and Restaurants. 6 The general empirical characteristics of our data when considering the firm as a unit, independent of the industry, are: i) size and age are not correlated (there is no systematic tendency for old firms to be large); ii) firms experiencing persistent negative cash flow over several years do not tend to be growing, profitable, young, nor small; iii) only young firms with positive cash flows are characterized by high rates of investment, growth rates, and being far more profitable than other young firms with negative cash flow, and in general when compared to older firms. Many of these observations contradict many of the claims made by the related empirical literature using other datasets. Besides, many of the above issues have not been carefully analyzed in the related literature as far we know, with any type of data and for any country. We here provide such an analysis. A main point, that again needs 5 We have used unconsolidated accounts for each company.
6 See ECB (2007) for a description of the empirical studies on financing constraints for different countries.
Notice that most studies consider only manufacturing, or an aggregate of industries. We do not include other industries because they are either too small or too large relatively to the average firm size we consider here (for example, fishing companies are too small, and telecommunication companies are too large). We also think that firms in the financial sector should be studied separately and differently.
stressing, is that classifying firm-year observations or firms by age or by size alone does not necessarily yield a group of firms with similar financial structures.
We also find, independent of industry and age, that cash flow, profits, sales growth and investment are larger (smaller) in the sample that considers firm-year observations with positive (negative) cash flows than in the sample that considers the firm as a unit. Moreover, the median age of the old and young firms in the sample considering firm-year observations, with positive and negative cash flow, appears to be much lower than the median age of the respectively older and young firm treated as a unit experiencing persistently positive and negative cash flow.
Regarding investment behavior we first find that, when considering firm-year observations with positive cash flows (financially stronger), relatively older firms have significant larger investment sensitivity to cash flow than younger firms; an exception to this pattern is found only for the Transportation sector. The well-known results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) coefficient is negative independent of the age of the firm. These are new results from which one should conclude that the cash flow position of a firm over its life cycle, its age, and the industry it belongs to, are important to consider before drawing conclusions about investment-cash flow sensitivities.
We also confront our empirical results with the theoretical results of Myers and Majluf (1984) who find that more liquid firms invest more; and Jensen (1986) and Hart and Moore (1995) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the details of the data, the methodology used for handling the data and hypotheses testing, and the estimation method. Section 3 includes the descriptive statistics of the key variables. Section 4 presents the econometric model, while Section 5 contains the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
7 This paper does not analyze how a firm's level of debt ratio or degree of indebtness affects its investment behavior. This is important, but will be the topic of another paper. 8 Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2006) postulate that firms may allocate free cash flow to reducing current debt and building savings and borrowing capacity in order to secure future investment. In such cases, entering the debt ratio as an explanatory variable could be expected to affect the cash flow coefficient.
Data and sampling procedures
The data in this study is based on information reported by limited liability companies to the consecutive negative cash flow, it must be a firm that is facing some sort of liquidity distress.
We do not find it relevant to characterize firms that experience negative cash flow exporadically during its lifecycle as having liquidity problems.
Third, to test directly the effect of market imperfections and financial frictions, we classify firms as old or young, within each of the industries and within each of the two groups of firms described above (with and without persistent negative cash flow). A firm is 10 Papers using Norwegian firm-level data are Johansen (1994) and Nilsen (2004 Let us now present a statistical summary of our key variables.
Some general stylized facts. Statistics Summary
First of all, to determine whether a firm is old or young, we calculate the median age of the firms in the group they belong to: its industry and if they experience positive or negative cash flow. income (principally depreciation allowances and amortization) and extraordinary items, minus dividends. Investment of year t (I t ) represents investment in plant and equipment during period t, and capital stock of year t-1 (K t-1 ) is the begyning of period (t-1) capital stock. We measure net income (NetInc t ) as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and extraordinary items (equivalent to EBITDA in COMPUSTAT). 12 We think it is appropriate to consider the relative age of the firm and not the absolute age across all the firms and industries because our sample includes both traditionally old and relatively new industries such as Data and Computer Technology. It is therefore not reasonable to compare ages across industries.
The purpose of Table 1 is to see if there are distributional patterns in those variables that are systematically related to the type of cash flow development a firm experiences over its lifecycle (persistent negative or positive cash flow), considering the firm's age. The statistical figures for firms unconditional on their age are not reported in Table 1 to save space, but we present their most important characteristics. Given that we are considering the relative age of the firms, that is the age of the firm within the industry they belong to, we describe firm characteristics within each industry. (c) By considering the age of the firms by industry, we find that the medians of the ratio of (g) The degree of leverage, when measured as the relative short-run debt and long-run debt with respect to total assets ratios 13 is, within each industry, larger for the median firm with negative cash flow than for the median firm with positive cash flow, independent of age.
(h) Even though there are systematic patterns for the relevant variables across industries, there are differences in the size variable across industries.
Detail statistics of the positive cash flow and negative cash flow firm-year observations are not here presented due to space limitations. There are however two general characteristics that are worthwhile to mention. First, independent of industry and age, the ratio of cash flow to capital stock (CF t /K t-1 ), the ratio of net income to total assets (NetInc t /Y t-1 ), sales changes (∆Sales t ), and the ratio investment to capital stock (I t /K t-1 ) are significantly larger (smaller) in the sample that considers firm-year observations with positive (negative) cash flows than in the sample that considers the firm as a unit. Importantly, NetInc t /Y t-1 is not only negative for young firms-year observations with negative cash flow but also for old firms-year observations with negative cash flow. This contrast our statistics for NetInc t /Y t-1 for older firms experiencing persistent negative cash flow where again the firm is treated as the unit.
Second, the median age of the old and young firms in the sample considering firm-year observations, with positive and negative cash flow, appears to be much lower than the median age of the respectively older and young firm treated as a unit experiencing persistently positive and negative cash flow.
Our main conclusions from considering the firm as a unit are: first, in any specific industry, there are differences in the financial structure between firms with negative cash flow and those with positive cash flow; second, there are also differences across industries for firms with negative cash flow and across industries for firms with positive cash flow.
Third, the median firm with persistent negative cash flow, young and old and across industries, has higher debt ratios, which may indicate that such firm's managers may not be not risk averse to such external funding, given that it is available, and/or may not mind being monitored by the lending institution. Our final important conclusion is that classifying firmyear observations only according to their age or size does not guarantee that we will have a sample of firms with similar financial structures. Firms (not firm-years) do experience different levels of cash flow over their lifecycles. It is necessary to measure the impact of such pattern on the firm's decision-making.
Specification of the Investment equation
The general form of the reduced-form investment equations that we here considered is:
where m=0,1. The adjustment cost α reflects the sluggish adjustment of capital stock that controlled for by firm specific effects, η i, which represents the unobserved individual-specific time-invariant effect which allows heterogeneity across individual firms but not across time.
The time-fixed effect is represented by d t , while the disturbance term by u it . These disturbances u it are assumed to be independent across individuals. The parameter β indicates the degree of sensitivity of investment to available internal finance after investment opportunities are controlled for through the variable ∆Sales t-1 and ∆Sales t-2 .
Variables in X are included alternatively which means that we have analyzed three specifications of investment behavior, depending on the explanatory variables. These specifications are:
-Specification 1: I t /K t-1, CF t /K t-1 , CF t-1 /K t-2 , ∆Sales t-1 , ∆Sales t-2 : the results are shown in column 2 in all the tables from 2 to 6.
-Specification 2: I t /K t-1, CF t /K t-1 , CF t-1 /K t-2 , ∆Sales t-1 , ∆Sales t-2 , ∆srcredit t /Y t-1 , and ∆srcredit t-1 /Y t-2 : the results are shown in column 3 in all the tables from 2 to 6.
-Specification 3: I t /K t-1, CF t /K t-1 , CF t-1 /K t-2 , ∆Sales t-1 , ∆Sales t-2 , ∆lrcredit t /Y t-1 , and
the results are shown in column 4 in all the tables from 2 to 6.
One important issue here is whether our inferences about the link between investment and liquidity could be biased and therefore subject to the same criticism as related studies using liquidity proxies (e.g., cash flow) for unobservable determinants of investment. As argued, these proxies are highly correlated with the firm's investment opportunities: High liquidity signals that the firm has done well and is likely to continue doing well. Thus, more liquid firms have better investment opportunities and try to invest more, including using internal funds. Our empirical strategy, however, sidesteps this problem because first of all, as a measure of investment opportunities we consider sales growth ∆sales t-1 to measure its contribution in the firms' investment pattern. 15 Note that the vast majority of firms in our data set are not listed 16 , and we cannot therefore obtain a proper measure of Tobin's Q since we have no information about the market valuation of the firms. 17 We have instead included the growth in sales ∆sales t-1 to minimize the problems of multicollinearity.
18
Moreover, we do not associate cash flow status with credit constraint. Our approach is very much in light with the work of Dasgupta and Sengupta (2008) who suggest that one does not need to interpret a significant large cash flow coefficient as an indication that there are financial market imperfections and that the firm is credit-constrained. It may just be that high liquidity firms transfer some of the current liquidity into the future postponing current potential investment in order to protect themselves from possible credit constraint. We argue 15 We have also estimated the investment equations with total sales and then net income/total assets. These are not reported due to space limitations but are available upon request. These estimates indicate that the introduction of total sales and net income/total assets as an explanatory variables have little effect on the coefficient measuring investment-cash flow sensitivity. 16 Most Norwegian firms that are public are in the industries of Oil Extraction, Telecommunications, Shipping, and Financial Services, which we do not deal with here. 17 The related literature has used Tobin's Q to control for investment opportunities. Yet, the debate has not been settled, as some argue that Tobin's Q is difficult to measure and that there are many other strong assumptions underlying the theory. For example, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) , Cummins et al. (1999) , Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) , and Alti (2003) argue that measurement problems associated with Tobin's Q will affect any estimated sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds. 18 We have used other proxies for investment opportunities such as Sales/K ration and the ratio of net income (EBITDA) to total assets. We never found substantial qualitative and quantitative differences among the different approaches. These are not presented here but are available upon request.
that it is also unlikely that any possible bias is higher for young firms with persistent positive cash flow than for old firms with persistent positive cash flow. Even if we accept that individual liquidity coefficient estimates may be biased, as long as the bias is the same for young and old firms, the estimated difference in the coefficients will be an unbiased estimate of the true difference. Rejection of equality of the coefficient then indicates that the true effects of liquidity are more important for one set of firms. Indeed, the hypothesis of equality of the coefficients is easily rejected here.
To account for the effect of information problems within our two groups of firms, we rather consider the firm's age to analyze its effect on the link between investment and liquidity. Age can be safely considered exogeneous with respect to a firm's financial choices.
In addition, since there could be possible correlations between the cash flow and investment opportunities; and between the error term of the investment equation and the cash flow, we use the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Blundell and Bond (1998) for panel data. This estimation method combines the set of moment conditions specified for the equations in first-differences with additional moment conditions specified for the equations in levels. The differences are instrumented by lagged levels of the regressors, and the lagged differences of the dependent variable are included as instruments for equation in levels. 19 Thus, all regressors are assumed to be endogenous. We use the Sargan/Hansen-test of overidentified restrictions as a joint test of model specification and instrumental selection. Moreover, since the moment conditions used by the first-differenced GMM estimator (from which we can also perform the Hansen-test) are a strict subset of those 19 The timing of the lags we use as instruments consists in all available lags starting t-3.
used by the system GMM estimator, we proceed in doing the Difference Sargan/Hansen test which is based on difference between the two standard Sargan/Hansen statistics. This is a more specific test to the assumption that the right-hand side variables in (1) are uncorrelated with the individual effects. The results on these test, not reported due to space limitations but available, indicate that in all cases that the additional moment conditions used in the level equations accepts their validity at least 5% level. We also report the m1 and m2 test for firstand second-order serial correlation of the first difference residuals. Both the m1 and m2 test are asymptotically standard normal under the null of no serial correlation in the error term. At last, we should mention that we use alternative instrument sets and we never obtain qualitative and quantitative different results.
Empirical Results on the investment-cash flow sensitivity
Tables 2 to 6 in the Appendix report the empirical estimates of equation (1) • Without taking into account age, we find that the investment of firms (when the firm is observations with negative cash flow after considering an aggregated set of industries. In fact, we also find that for negative cash firm-year observations, the coefficient that relates investment and cash flow is negative and significant in each of the industries considered here, which again contrasts our estimates when treating the firm as a unit. This only means that firms continue investing in spite of liquidity shortages.
Comparing old and young firms with positive and negative cash flow within industries
• When we consider the age of the firm as a proxy for the degree of asymmetric information, treating the firm as a unit, and only those firms (by industry) that are financially strong, we find that old firms either do not show any sensitivity of investment to cash flow, or show positive sensitivity that is significantly weaker than for younger firms. In the Transportation sector, not even young firms will show any investment-cash flow sensitivity.
• Hart and Moore (1995) that managers' greater preferences for using internal funds instead of debt, may not always applied. That will depend importantly of the availability of internal funds and the degree of market imperfections. When firms are old and liquid, they can dispense themselves of new debt to finance investment. When firms are more likely to face market imperfections because they are young, even when facing little liquidity (i.e. persistant negative cash flow over certain number of years), they may find it necessary to use their new issue debt to finance investment even though they are being exposed to be supervised and monitored.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes how the liquidity position of firms affects the well-known but controversial relationship between cash flow and investment. To achieve our goal, we classify firms, and not firm-year observations as commonly considered in the related literature, into those that are financially weak or have experienced persistent negative cash flow over their lifecycle, and those that are financially strong or have persistent positive cash flow over their lifecycle. We also find that classifying the firms according to their age while controlling for whether firms have been financially weak or strong over their lifecycles, is a fruitful approach to reevaluate the results of Fazzari-Hubbard-Peterson, and Kaplan-Zingales, being both of them important works. As far as we know this represents a contribution to the literature.
We find that when one only considers financially strong firms within the industry they belong to; older firms have lower investment sensitivity to cash flow than younger firms.
These results confirm those of Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen. If we do not however take age into account and only compare firms that are financially weak with firms that are financially strong, we find that in every industry, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is stronger for financially stronger firms than for financially weaker firms, which confirms the Kaplan- negative over their sample period, and find also negative gross cash flow regression coefficient for these firms. They argue that these firms are very small startup companies and constitute a trivial number in relation to their whole sample of firms. Within any of our industries, firms that experience negative cash flow in their life cycle are not a small part of our sample, and not necessarily young or small. We again find that such negative sensitivity, whenever it is significant, applies only to firms in specific industries, either young or old.
We think that with our methodology makes an important contribution to the literature.
This methodology is more appropriate than the firm-year approach from both the econometric, economic theory, and economic policy points of view. After all, all the theoretical predictions are based on treating the firm as the basic unit and not firm-years.
Optimal policies also are design to be implemented to firms with specific characteristics. It is then important that we know and treat the firm as a unit. It is a mistake to assume that firms always experience negative cash flow early in their lifecycles, and positive cash flow later in their lifecycles. Grouping firm-year observations with negative cash flow does not need to represent the young firms. In fact, this issue has not been studied well in the related literature.
Our dataset indicate that within each of our industries, the median firm that experiences persistent negative cash flow is not necessarily younger than the median firm that experiences persistent positive cash flow. Therefore, classifying firm-year observations in the raw data according to age, even within industries, does not guarantee that we will have a sample of firms with similar financial structures. For example, within of our industries, persistent negative-cash-flow firms have higher leverage independent of age, and the older ones are not much larger than the young ones with persistent positive cash flow. We remark that our work's main emphasis is the analysis of how firms' investment decisions are different among firms experiencing different persistent patterns of cash flow over their lifecycles.
Across industries, there are also differences among firms with negative cash flow and firms with positive cash flow. We conclude that to understand the implications of the different degrees of sensitivity between investment and cash flow, it is important to take into account the cash flow levels a firm faces during its lifecycle, before we consider age and size to be a proxy for credit constraints/asymmetric information. We have demonstrated here that the investment-cash flow sensitivity depends on the cash flow pattern the firm experiences over its lifecycle, on the age of the firm, and on the industry to which the firm belongs. 
